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Summary Accountof the Timingof Inventory
investment Cycles
'Ve cannow draw' togetherthe essentialelementsregardingthe timing of turningpoints ininventoryinvestment, its
explanation, and interpretation.
The firstquestion is howtotal inventoryinvestmentbehaves. For ananswer one has todependupon the unsatisfactory
indica. tions of annualdata. Thesetell as cleara story as suchdatacan. In bothcurrent andconstant pricestotal investmentreached its peaks andtroughs in thesame yearsas general businessat 7 of the 50 turns betweenthe two worldwars. Investmentby manufactur- ers did thesame, and investmentby retailersand wholesalersdid so at 8 out ofso turns. Thefew investmentturns that didnot co- incide withthose inbusinesswere evenlydivided betweenleads and lags.
As they standthese figuressuggest thatinventoryinvestment tends neitherto leadnor to lag behindthe turningpoints of busi- ness cycles. Thepossibility thatthere isa regular tendencyto lead or tolag bya short intervalis notprecluded. Butour tests indicate thatwhen annualdata covering5 cycles fail to indicate a lead or lag,the actuallead or lag,if any, willrarely be longer than, say,3 months. Ifwe take intoconsiderationa certain bias due to theprocess of pricecorrectionon which theestimates are based, a shortleadseems more likelythan a shortlag, butwe can- not be sure.
This finding,thoughnecessarilyimprecise, is ofgreat interest. It suggeststhat thecommon assumptionthat stocksare kept at a constant ratioto output andsalesmay be invalid.Were inventory- output andinventory-salesratiosconstant, cyclesin inventory in-the
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TIMING OFINVENTORY INVESTMENT CYCLES
vestment would coincide with cycles in the rate of change in sales
and output. It seems plausible to suppose, however, that the rate
of change in output reaches its maxima and minima before the
peaks and troughs of business. If, as it seems, inventory investment
turns within a very short intervalof the turns in business, it prob-
ably lags behind the rate of change in output.
This probability was confirmed by a study of rates of change
in both aggregate and manufacturing output. The rate ofgrowth
or decline in aggregate output seems tohave retarded markedly
and regularly long before the peaks and troughs ofbusinessoften
during the first half of expansions or contractions. These retarda-
tions have sometimes been followed by periods of renewedaccel-
eration, but the subsequent peaks in the rate of growth or decline
have rarely been as pronounced as the original. Inventoryinvest-
ment, in contrast, is near its trough when expansionbegins and, at
least in annual series, sweeps up smoothly to a peak near abusi-
ness peak, then smoothly down to atrough near a business trough.
Further study of the rate of change in manufacturingproduc-
tion confinned these general conclusions andadded some interest-
ing detail. During contractions output tends todecline at an in-
creasingly rapid pace until about the middle of the phase,after
which a period of retardation sets in. During expansionsthe rate of
growth behaves less regularly. At the beginningof the phase out-
put has usually been growing rapidly,then more slowly. Retarda-
tion has sometimes characterized theremainder of the phase but
often it has been followed by a renewed spurtthat sometimes
brought the rate of growth in output to levels ashigh as or higher
than those at the beginning of expansion.
These observations about the timing ofinventory investment
have an important bearing on the course andcharacter of busi-
ness cycles. If inventory-outputratios remained constant and in-
ventory investment movedsynchronously with, and in proportion
to, the rate of change in output,inventory investment would rise
more rapidly at thebeginning of expansions and fall morerapidly
at the beginning of contractionsthan it does. This would make the
curves of output andincome in the opening stages ofcyclical re-
coveries and recessions more precipitousthan they are. When the
retardation of output growth sets in, inventoryinvestment wouldCHAPTER TWEN.
drop and tend to bring thebusiness expansionto an end.Similarly, when the retardation ofoutput decline sets in during
contraction inventory liquidation woulddrop and tend to bringon a revival of business. Continuedgrowth in inventoryinvestment duringcx. pansions and continueddecline duringcontractions afterOutput growth or decline beginsto retard means that itacts to Prolongthe upward and downward swingsof business. Itmay be said, there.
fore, that the lag of inventoryinvestment behind therate of change in output serves tomoderate and to lengthenbusinessexpansiom and contractions. These, ofcourse, are tendencies. Howinfluential the behavior of inventoriesis dependsupon the magnitudeof in- ventory investment changescompared with those inother cate- gories of expenditure__thesubject of Chapter2i.
Study of the behaviorof total inventoryinvestment and its major components leavesus with two solid findings:first, inven. tory investment turnsnear business cycle turns;secondly, it tends to lag behind the peaksand troughs in therate of change inoutput. Several problemsremain. Oneconcerns the precise timingof in- vestment. Is it actuallysynchronous with businesscycle turns or does it tend to leador to lag by a short interval?Secondly, does planned investmentmove in the same wayas observed investment? A third problemarises withrespect to the causes offluctuations in investment. Why doesit lag behind therate of change inoutput and turnnear the turns in business?To helpanswer these ques- dons, we examinethe evidenceon the movements ofinvestment in manufacturers'stocks.
From the viewpointof cyclical behavior,inventories held by manufacturers are nothomogeneous The studyof inventory cycles in Part Twoindicated thenecessity for distinguishingfour major classes: goods inprocess, raw materials,finished goods madeto order, and finishedgoods sold fromstock. Their behavior differs because themotives thatcontrol inventory policyvary.%'ithin two, raw materialsand finishedgoods sold from stock,still further distinctions arerequired. Thesestem from the fact thatamong manufacturers of differenttypes of commoditythe ability to con- trot the rateat which materialsare received or produced varies. Moreover, not allcommodities can bestored in thesame degree. These differencesare reflected in thecyclical behavior of stocks.1
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They led us to distinguish raw materials purchased from other do-
mestic manufacturers or dealers from agricultural products pur-
chased from producers or any type of imports that must be pur-
chased long before they are to be used. Manufacturers' receipts of
goods m the former class can be rapidly adjusted to changes in cur-
rent requirements. Their receipts in the latter class cannot be ad-
justed promptly. Again, among finished goods sold from stock we
have to distinguish goods made from agricultural materials that
cannot well be stored in crude form from goods made from other
materials. Fabrication of the former is heavily influenced, if not
controlled, by haphazard changes in supply, which in turn affects
stocks of finished goods. Production of goods made from other ma-
terials follows changes in demand. Finally, there is a distinction to
be made between finished durables and nondurables. The first may
be stored for long periods; and the inventory-sales ratio may be
allowed to vary widely. The second must be sold promptly; and
the inventory-sales ratio must be kept fairly stable.
These distinctions are as essential to an understanding of inven-
tory investment cycles as they are for inventory cycles. As we have
seen, the cyclical behavior of inventory investment differs signifi-
icantly from class to class. However, the characteristic features
of investment in each class were more difficult to establish than
were those of inventory cycles because cycles in the rate of change
in inventories are more variable. This, of course, was only to be ex-
pected. The first differences in any series that does not move con-
tinuously are bound to follow a less steady course than their cumu-
lative counterpart. To illustrate: small fluctuations in the amount
by which, say, receipts exceed the consumption of a raw material
cause the rate of inventory investment to turnalthough inventories
continue upward. This additional element of volatility aggravates
the difficulties of using small samples of series covering short peri-
ods. The significant tendencies in the data, which would doubtless
be revealed if the records were comprehensive, are often masked
by random movements in the few commodities for which we have
records. Generaliration has, therefore, been more difficult with re-
spect to cycles in investment than in inventories.I shall, however,
summarize the main suggestions I believe the study yields.For this
purpose, I neglect certain minor groupsof stocks which appear to
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behave irregularlyduring business cycles,and confine
attention to classes whose actionseems to shape the regularpattern ofmanu. facturers' totalinvestment.
iGoods in Process andFinished GoodsMade toOrder These twogroups, which togetheraccount for 25to 30Percent of manufacturers' stocks,may conveniently beconsideredtogether. For neither isany useful amount ofdata available.But bothare closely tied tomanufacturingproduction. Ifmore goodsare to be produced,more must flow throughthe fabricatingprocess. And when goodsare made to order,they aregenerallydelivered promptly. Theyremain in stockduring the timerequired forpack- ing and toarrange transportationand, if deliveryis to thepur. chaser's location,during the timerequired forshipment. Ifwe ignore seasonalfactors and changesin the compositionof output, the inventory-outputratio shouldremain approximatelyconstant If it does, theabsolute changesin inventoriesshould beapproxi- mately proportionalto those in production.As explainedin Chap- ter 15, investmentin goods inprocess should tendto lead therate of change inoutput. By thesame token, investmentin goods made to order shouldtend to lagbehind therate of change inoutput In both instances,however, thedifferences intiming betweenchanges in investmentand in output,at least on theaverage for all manu- facturing,are so small thatthey may safelybe neglected forpres- ent purposes.
With theinformationnow available,we can best judgethe movements ofinventory investmentin these categoriesf mm the cyclicalpattern of therate of changein output.From the view- point of cyclicaltiming, theproblemwas to determine thebehavior of the rateof change inoutput, andone purpose of thedetailed study ofrates of changein manufacturingwas to ascertain the cyclical patternof investmentin stocks ofgoods inprocess and in finished goodsmade to order.
Translated intoterms of inventoryinvestment,our observatioi about thecyclical patternof changesin output implythat invest inent in goods inprocess and infinished goodsmade to orderusu- ally reach peaksand troughslong beforebusiness activity. Not in- frequently, however,inventoryinvestment in thesecategoiiestW1
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TIUING OF JNVENTORY INVESTMENT CYCLES 465
up again just before the peak of business. Before business troughs,
a reversal of this sort is not characteristic of investment.
2 Raw Materials
For reasons explained in Chapters 9, 10, and i6, manufacturers
try to maintain a fairly constant ratio between their stocks of raw
materials and the rate at which they are consumed in production.
If we could assume that they are completely successful, we could
use the rate of change in output as an indicator of investment, just
as we did in the case of goods in process and finished goods made
to order. But such an assumption is obviously invalid. &causc a
period, more or less long, elapses between an order for supplies and
delivery, manufacturers must foresee their requirements for raw
materials some time ahead. The order-delivery interval is indeed
short for most raw materials. Even so, errors are inevitable. And
whether the errors of manufacturers offset one another is uncer-
tain. Much depends upon the size of the individual errors and, even
more, on whether all or most manufacturers make errors of the
same sort at the same time. Such points can hardly be settled by
general reasoning. It appeared, therefore, that in the absence of
direct observation, no useful statement could be made about the
relation between output and inventory investment.
In this situation, it is especially unfortunate that records on
stocks of raw materials arc so scarce. The results they yield are
badly in need of more empirical support. But as far as they go,
they suggest the following conclusions.
i) For commodities supplied under conditions allowing manu-
facturers quickly to adjust receipts to requirements, the rate of
change in stocks of raw materials is positively correlated with the
rate of change in output in the industry using thematerials. De-
spite errors that presumably affect the individual firm'sdecisions
about purchases, this relation emerged clearly from comparisons
between the stocks and rates of fabrication of three rawmaterials
of this charactercotton, silk, and hides. Since about 75 percent
of the raw materials used by manufacturers are procuredunder
conditions similar to those that characterize oursmall sample, it
is arguable that inventory investment in rawmaterials is positively
correlated with the rate of change m output m mostAmencan in-
.dustry. Indeed,among manufacturersas a whole, thistendt should stand forthall themore sharply. Thechanceernof pre- diction by individualmanufacturersare more likelyto offsetone another. And theforces makingfor manufacturers'
errors are lc likely to operatein the samedirection indifferentindustriesthan in a single industry.
A positive relationbetween investmentand therate of changein output for this majorfraction ofraw materials isnot thesank as a synchronous relationbetween investmentand therate of change in output forall raw materials.It is, indeed,two stepsremovtJ. First, inventoryinvestment probablylags behindthe rateof change inoutput even in thecase of materials forwhichmanufac-. turers can quicklyadjust receiptsto requirements.This is plausible if weassume that manufacturersjudge theirfuturerequirements by recentexperience. Anupturn in therate of increasein output would not thenbe matchedimmediately byan upturn in therate of increase inreceipts of materials,and inventorieswould not im- mediatelygrow proportionately.But manufacturerswould attempt to eliminate thediscrepancy insubsequent periods.Such a tend- ency for investmentto lag wasapparent in thecase of silk stocks, though not inthose ofcotton and hides.As pointedout in Chap- ter 57, however,lags mightwell have beendiscoveredeven for cotton and hideswere we in a positionto make timingmeasure- ments on a finerscale. Moreover,since our threematerials are all procured fromdealers whohold stocksready for delivery,the in- terval betweenorder andreceipt isespecially short.It would lx longer and thetendency to lagpresumablymore marked if we had data for materialspurchased fromother manufacturers,particu- lady frommanufacturerswhose goodsare usually madeto oTder rather than soldfrom stock.
'Fhere isreason, therefore,to expectinvestment to lag behind the rate ofchange inoutput even whenmaterials are procured under conditionsthat permita fairly rapidadjustment of receipts to requirements.As pointedout above,however, not all materia are obtainedunder suchfavorableconditions. Examplesof ma- terials whosesupplycannot promptlybe adjustedto requureflUt indicate thatthe lag ofinvestmentbehind therate of change in out- put in theindustries usingthe materialsis very long.Peak rates ofthAn
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TIMING OFINVENTORY INVESTMENT CYCLES 467
accumulation, indeed, usually lag behind the peak in output itself
as well as in the rate of change in output. They come, that is, dur-
ing contractions in output. Peak rates of inventory liquidation gen-
erally follow revivals of output. For such materials, therefore, in-
ventory investment tends to be rising In the period just before out-
put reaches its peak and to be falling just before output reaches
its low point. Such behavior by this minor fraction of raw materials
reinforces the shorter lag in the major fraction.
All this leaves us uncertain, within a considerable range, about
the timing of investment in raw materials relative to the turns in
general business. If investment kept pace with the change in out-
put, it would tend to lead business turns by a long interval, perhaps
as much as half a phase on the average. In the past a lead of this
length has been a fairly regular characteristic of the rate of change
in output relative to business cycle troughs. In expansions the rate
of increase in output has usually reached a maximum long before
the business peak, but it has sometimes gone to a second peak in
the last quarter of expansion. As stated, however, investment in
stocks of raw materials probably tends to lag behind the rate of
change in output. To this degree, of course, the lead of invest-
ment in raw materials relative to business turns must be shorter
than the lead of the rate of change in output. How much shorter
it is impossible now to estimate and almost futile to guess. Mean-
while, let us recall that a lead of half a phase, that is, two 'stages'
in National Bureau terminology, amounts to about13months in
the average expansion and about io months in the average con-
traction. A lag of investment in raw materials behind the rate of
change in output of even 6 months would still leave this class of
investment leading business turns by several months. This, of
course, is presumably subject to considerableirregularity, especially
near business peaks, corresponding to theirregularity in the timing
of turns in the rate of change in output.
Finished Goods
Of the 40 percent of all manufacturers' finished goods stocks,be-
tween an eighth and a quarter are made toorder. Investment in
them, as we have seen, fluctuates like that in goods in process.
Another small class are finished goods soldfrom stock whose468
CHAPTERTWENTY
production cyclesarc influenced mainly fromthe side ofsupply. The chief cyclical characteristicof investmentin thisclass ijt irregularity. It cannot beimportant inexplaining thetypical cyclical pattern ofaggregate investment inmanufacturm'stock. Still a third smallcategory consists ofgoods sold fromstock whose production cyclesare governed principallyby changesin demand but which, forone reason or another,are perishableEvi- dence about the behaviorof thisgroup is almost wholly
lacking, but general reasoningsuggests that since thegoods areperishable they must be disposed ofpromptly; wide variationsin theinventory. sales ratio couldnot be long tolerated.If so, the rateof changein output is again a good guideto the cyclicalbehavior ofinvestment. But oncemore it seems plausible that
manufacturers willnot be able to predict salesaccurately enoughto modify theirholdings of stocks simultaneouslywith changes insales. On thecontrary, changes in the rate ofincrease in sales willprobably be followedby changes in the rate ofincrease in output onlyafter an interval,and appropriate changes instocks willoccur somewhat laterstill. Th it seems reasonableto think that investmentin this class offin- ished goods lagsbehind therate of change inoutput by a shoit period, much in thesame way as in thecase of investment inraw materials.
Whatever the valueof this suggestion,it appliesto only a small class of stocksinall likelihoodless than5 percent of all manu- facturers' inventories.Because of thenature of the goods, only small stockscan be kept relativeto sales. And toreduce still fuiiher the risk of inventorylosses, manyperishable goodsindustries pro- duce to order ratherthan to stock.
There remainsa last important classof finished goodssold from stockdurable stapleswhose productioncycles are governedby changes indemandconstitutingbetween 20 and25 percent of manufacturers' stocks.According to therather good sample of such goods forwhich recordsare available, itappears that when shipments turn downafter the peakof business,investment 1ea up sharply. (Iam writing here inthe relativesense in which a de- cline in therate of liquidationis equivalentto an increase in ac- cumulation.)Manufacturers,presumably caughtoff guard by an unexpected cyclicaldecline in sales,were unable to reduce their
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TIMING 0! INVENTORY INVESTMENT CYCLES 49
rate of fabrication soon enough. During at least the early months of
most contractions, the rate of accumulation of stocks increases,
then levels off. A point m doubt is whether a downturn in invest-
ment begins before the trough in business. The marked indications
of such a downturn in long contractions, those of threeyears or
longer, are consistent with the finding that in long contractions the
peak m stocks of this type Is reached well before theupturn in
business (Ch. i i). There are good reasons, moreover, for expect-
ing such a downturn in the last part of shorter phases. The stocks
that continue to accumulate during contraction, first because the
downturn of shipments is not expected, later because manufactur-
ers choose to keep their production from falling as far and fast as
their sales, must become an increasing burden on the companies
holding them. The motive to reduce the rate at which stocks pile
up, if not to begin liquidation, must become stronger and stronger.
Finally, there is evidence that toward the end of a business con-
traction but before the trough, the number of industries whose
production is falling diminishes, the number whose production is
rising increases. This undoubtedly reflects an increase in the sales
of some industries. And when sales increase, the rate of accumu-
lation of finished goods drops sharply. The fact that the number
of industries in which this may be presumed to occur grows in the
last stage of contraction bolsters the presumption that during this
period the aggregate rate of accumulation of these stocks by manu-
facturers tends to fall.
There are then good reasons for expecting such a decline. But
however good the argument, the fact is that our sample does not
dearly support such an hypothesis. As far as contractions of short
and moderate length are concerned, the matter remains in doubt.
All these observations may be repeated for business expansions.
The upturn is accompanied by a sharp reduction in inventory in-
vestment. The downward movement continues for some months,
then levels off. In long expansions the rate of liquidation falls be-
fore the peak in business, then accumulation begins. But in short
or moderately long expansions, the evidence that investment turns
up before the peak of business is passed isdoubtful.£10
CHAPTER
4Pattern of Total Investment
We arc now ina position to offer a partialexplanation ofthe cyc. lical behavior ofmanufacturers' inventoryinvestmentitstend. ency to lag behind the rate of changein output andreach IUInIJg points in the neighborhood ofthe turning pointsof businecycles. For we can see, at leastroughly, the diversebehavior of themajor components of total investment, establishtheir appm,jfl
size and identify the motivesand technical Conditiopthataccount for their cyclicalmovement. There are seriousgaps, but theaccount takes us a considerabledistance. I shallattempt a highlysummar. ized statement interms of movements duringa busincontrac. tion Withsome exceptions theaccount for expansions
Would fol- low the same linesexcept that the direction ofinventorymovement would be reversed.
i) In the openingstage of a contraction,investment ingoods in process and in finished goodsmade to order,together accowing for 25-30percent of all manufacturers'holdings, fallsrapidly. This rapid drop is a simpleconcomitant of the sharpreduction inoutput to which stocksare technically bound.
Investment in rawmaterials, abouto percent of the total, falli less rapidly. Manufacturersin general wouldlike to decreasetheir stocks of raw materialsin roughproportion to the declinein the volume of business, butfor manyreasons cannot. A cyclical down- turn in sales seemsto catch businessmenunawares. Even if they begin to reduce theirorders for suppliesimmediately, a period of varying lengthintervenes betweenorder and delivery.The inter- val may vary froma few days to manymonths dependingupon the distancea manufacturer is fromhis source of supplies,on the mode oftransportation, andon the speed with whichsupplien fill orders. Inaddition, manufacturersare likely to hesitate at fimt about altering thevoluie of theirpurchas, since theyare uncer- tain, at themoment of recession,about thecourse of businest Some manufacturersfinally, are boundby long term commit- ments made when theoutlook was brighter.These will be canceled if possible, butoften they willprevent a reduction in receipts of materials for a long time.As a result, stocksof raw materials con- tinue to rise duringthe firstor 4 montJof contraction, though at a declining rate,and then arereduced only gradually.Dr
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Offsetting these declines in investment in thefirst stage of con-
traction is a rapid increase in investment in finished durablessold
from stock. Most such goods are produced in industries inwhich
output is governed principally by changes in demand. (Finished
goods of this sort are perhaps 20-25 percent of manufacturers'
total stocks.) Again, a decline in business finds manufacturersun-
prepared. Their sales and shipments drop before theycan reduce
their output. And when they do reduce it, they doso less rapidly
than shipments are falling. Manufacturers apparently prefer to
see their stocks of finished goods, which have been largely liqui-
dated in the preceding expansion, pile up rather than curtail their
operations more drastically. As the goods in questionare durable
staples, an accumulation of stocks for. the sake of cushioning pro-
duction somewhat from the impact of declining sales can be tol-
erated.
The movement of these four categories of investment presuma-
bly causes a relatively small decline in total investment. I say pre-
sumably because it is a weakness of this account that, with respect
to one hnportant matter, it necessarily proceeds in qualitative
terms. It is impossible, on the basis of the sample data now avail-
able, to measure precisely the relative rates of change in the dif-
ferent categories of stocks. One can say that 2 5-30 percent of the
total fall rapidly, that 40 percent fall slowly, and that another 20-
25 percent rise rapidly. I presume that this means a relatively
slow rise in total stocks. And this is consistent with the general
showing of the comprehensive annual data. But we cannot be cer-
tain until adequate monthly data are available for all the signifi-
cant inventory classes. This is an unavoidable diffIculty which
qwdlfies the account of the early part of contraction and restricts
equally the significance of the remainder of this hypothesis.
2) Liquidation of goods in process and of finished goods made to
order usually increases until about the middle of contraction.
Judging by the rate of decline in output, the trough in these cate-
gories of investment sometimes precedes, sometimes follows the
midpoint, but the rate has usually been higher in the second quar-
ter than in the first and sometimes even higher in the third quarter.
At the same time, the liquidation of raw materials, which lagged
in the early months of contraction, begins to proceed more rapidly.472
CHAPTER Typj
The accumulationor slow liquidation in the first
quarter gives ri to redundant inventoriesrdative to thesmaller Volumeof bui. ness, and manufacturare driven to curtail their
orders Iflo drastically. Finally, therate of accumulation offlnishcjgoods, jf it does not fall off,at least does not continueto increasemuch. There is, consequently,clear indicationthat thepace of invent
liquidation acceleratesin the middlequarters ofCofltractjo; at least until output beginsto decline less rapidly.
3) At some point in the lasthalf of contractionoutput beginsto fall at a Slowerpace. This may sometimeshappen evenbefore the midpoint, but, inany event, rarely later thanthe end of thethird or the beginning of the fourthquarter. When itoccurs, liquklatj of goods inprocess and of finishedgoods made toorder also be- gins to fall. Investmentin these goods, inthe relativesense in which we use the term, rises, butis countered byinvestrnin the other two major groups. Becausemanufacturers donot foresee changes in the pace ofbusiness far enoughin advance,investment inraw materials, the largestsingle group, probablycontinues to fall for a few months after therate of decline inoutput begins to moderatt And because thestocks of finishedgoods, which havebeen piling up since the beginningof the phase,become increasinglyhca, manufacturers at leastcheck the increase intheir rate ofaccumu- lation. If the phaseis long enoughand prioraccumulations hea%y enough, liquidationmay even start. Thusfor a few monthsafter the rate of declinein output beginsto diminish, inventoryinvest- ment in theaggregate probablyContinues to fall.
4) The precedinganalysis explains inbrief why inventoryinvest- ment declines fromthe beginning ofcontraction until near the end; also why ittends to lag behindthe rate of changein out- put. But it fails to settlea final question. Doesaggregate investment turn up shortly beforethe revival ofbusiness andso help account for the upturn?Annual estimatescannot provide theanswer and when we turnto monthly data,we are left equally uncertain.
Investment in goodsin process andin finished goodsmade to order certainly tendsto rise in the latermonths of contraction because the peak in therate of decline inoutput is usually passed still earlier. Moredoubtful is thecase of raw materials.Since invest- ment in rawmaterials probablylags behind therate of change
I
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in output, it may still be decliningat the end of contraction. This
is the more likely the later therate of change in outputturns up.
It is lelikely if the rate of changein output turnsup early in con-
traction, as it sometimes does. Buteven if investment in rawma-
terials begins to rise, the behaviorof investment in finishedgoods
is open to question. In longcontractions stocks finally becomeso
heavy that either liquidation beginsor the rate of accumulation
falls before the end of the phase.The same may betrue of the
somewhat shorter contractions thanthe 3-year phases I have been
calling 'long'. These declines ininvestment, when theyoccur, act
to offset the increases in the other categories.
I conclude, therefore, that thebehavior of investment toward
the very end of contraction is highlyuncertain. It is determined
partly by the lead in the rate of changein output, which varies
from cycle to cycle, and partly by themovement of investment in
finished goods, which dependsupon the length of the phase.
5) The above analysis assumes implicitly thataggregate invest-
ment falls in a smooth curve to its trough, then rises.This assump-
tion cannot be confirmed by annual data,and, if it is invalid, an-
other hypothesis is open tous. Let us suppose that the tendency,
such as it is, for investment in finished goodsto fall before business
reaches a trough is not sufficient to offset the increasein investment
(decline in the rate of liquidation) in stocks ofgoods in process,
finished goods made to order, andraw materials. Aggregate in-
vestment in inventories would then begin to rise before business
reached a trough. This tendency may nevertheless be concealed
in annual data by events immediately following the business
trough. When sales start to rise, there is alwaysa sharp drop in
the rate of accumulation of finished goods anda beginning of
rapid liquidation. It seems likely also that stocks ofraw materials
drop rapidly for a short time. In both cases, the reductionm in-
vestment may be due to the failure of manufacturers to foresee the
rise in sales and to prepare for it by increasing production of fin-
ished goods and purchases of raw materials. The result is thatag-
gregate inventory investment in the year of the business cycle
troughisreduced by involuntarydisinvestmentafter the
(monthly) trough has passed, though it may have been rising due
to a planned decline in liquidation before the trough. If this pos..CflAPTERy.y
sibility should be confirmed, and it isnot inconsistentwith the
present evidence, planned inventory investmentmay be onecau of cyclical revival, though theprocess is concealed inannual data. 6) During expansions there isa further element ofuncertaiiny Although the rate of change inoutput usually reachesa high point
in the early part of the phase,then recedes, it hassometimes tended to rise again in the lastquarter of expansion. Otherthings being equal, this should reducethe oCCasions wheninvestment in manufacturers' inventories leadsa downturn comparedwith the
occasions on which it leadsupturns.
Despite its manygaps and inadequacies, thisdccount helps to es-
tablish and explain two significantaspects of the dynamics ofbusi- ness cycles: the approximate synchronism
between business cycles
and inventory investmentand the lag of inventoryinvestment be.
hind the rate of change inoutput. For the latter, twogeneraj fac-
tors are responsible: One is thevarying interval requiredfor ded
sion, for liquidation ofpast commitments, and forpurchase, pro- duction, andtransportation before a change inthe rate of out-
put and sales is reflected in thevolume of investment inraw ma-
terials inventories. The otheris the attempt ofmanufacturto
cushion the impact ofchanges in saleson production by tolerating
large counter-cyclicalchanges in the stock offinished goods. With
more adequate data, thesequalitative conclusionsmay be given
more precision, and themoot question settled whetherinventory
investment regularlyoperates to initiate revivals andrecessions of
business at large.